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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-2301
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
v.
CHRISTOPHER BARFIELD,
                               Appellant
__________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-0481-1)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 30, 2009
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
Filed: October 9, 2009
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Barfield’s appeal of his conviction and sentence presents two issues
for our determination: (1) whether the District Court improperly relied on hearsay
evidence to calculate Barfield’s Guidelines range; and (2) whether judicial determination
     The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and our jurisdiction1
is proper under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742.
2
of Barfield’s prior felony convictions, which increased the maximum statutory term of
imprisonment, was permissible under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  1
Because we conclude that the hearsay evidence relied upon by the District Court
possessed the requisite degree of reliability and was thus admissible, and that its
determination regarding Barfield’s prior convictions was proper, we will affirm the order
of the District Court.
Because we write for the benefit of the parties, we confine our discussion to the
facts salient to this appeal.  On June 26, 2007, Christopher Barfield robbed Fatema
Cheeseborough at gunpoint.  After Cheeseborough informed a friend, Matthew James, of
the incident, the pair confronted Barfield.  During the ensuing exchange, Barfield shot
James in the stomach.  Cheeseborough promptly reported the shooting to police,
providing a complete description of the assailant.  Cheeseborough and a second
eyewitness, Sharita Wright, subsequently identified Barfield as the shooter in a photo
array, and Barfield was arrested shortly thereafter.  At the time of Barfield’s arrest,
officers recovered a gun on defendant’s person, and a ballistics analysis linked the
weapon to shells recovered from the scene of the shooting.  A jury convicted Barfield of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(e).  At sentencing, the District Court, relying chiefly on Detective Christopher
     “Crime of violence” is defined in pertinent part as “any offense under federal or state2
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that--(1) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.(a)(1). 
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Casee’s testimony regarding statements made by Cheeseborough and Wright to police,
determined that Barfield used or possessed a firearm or ammunition “in connection with a
crime of violence” —specifically, the robbery and shooting of June 26, 2007—and,2
accordingly, increased Barfield’s offense level from 33 to 34. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A).  Barfield was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment, a term within
the applicable Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. 
 Barfield’s central contention on appeal is that the District Court’s Guidelines
calculation rested on unreliable hearsay evidence, and that augmentation of his offense
level under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) was thus improper.  Factual findings relevant to a
Guidelines calculation need only be proven by the government by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (applying
preponderance of the evidence standard to “all facts relevant to the Guidelines”).  We
review factual findings underlying a Guidelines calculation for clear error, United States
v. Jiminez, 513 F.3d 62, 85 (3d Cir. 2008); see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), but exercise plenary
review of questions of law, including the proper construction of the Guidelines, United
States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243 (3d Cir. 2000), and the admissibility of hearsay
evidence, United States v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996).  
4Hearsay evidence is admissible in sentencing proceedings, provided it has
“sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Brothers, 75 F.3d at
848 (quoting United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1989)) (noting that use
of hearsay in making findings for purposes of Guidelines sentencing violates neither the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 nor the Due Process Clause, but that to avoid
“misinformation of constitutional magnitude,” such testimony must have sufficient
indicia of reliability); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982); see
also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).  Factors bearing on the reliability of hearsay testimony include
the declarant’s memory, perception, and credibility, and the presence of corroborating (or
conflicting) evidence.  See United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 662, 664-67 (3d Cir.
1993); see United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 776 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d
1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 1990).
Barfield contends that Cheeseborough and Wright’s statements to police, offered
through Detective Casee at the sentencing hearing, lacked the requisite reliability and
were thus inadmissible.  Casee testified that Cheeseborough promptly filed a police report
after the robbery, provided a physical description of the assailant, and identified Barfield
during a subsequent photo array.  Casee testified, further, that Wright also identified
Barfield as the assailant in a photo array shortly after the shooting, and that
Cheeseborough and Wright were steadfast in their belief that Barfield had committed the
5robbery and shooting.
Cheeseborough’s statements to police exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability for
admission under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) and our precedents.  Cheeseborough’s clear
perception and memory of the incident support the reliability of her identification.
Cheeseborough’s close physical proximity to Barfield, who wore no disguise, enabled her
clearly to apprehend his physical features.  Cheeseborough’s memory was not impaired
by the passage of time; rather, Cheeseborough promptly memorialized her observations,
filing a detailed police report immediately after the incident and, a few days later,
identifying Barfield in a photo array.  See United States v. Leekins, 493 F.3d 143, 151
(3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that the “detail and internal consistency” of police report,
together with the “other corroborating material,” provide sufficient indicia of the
reliability); cf. Simmons, 964 F.2d at 776 (deeming unreliable testimony of addict
informant with memory impairment).  
Cheeseborough’s identification of Barfield is also corroborated by other evidence.
See United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir.2001) (“One factor evidencing the
reliability of hearsay statements . . . is external consistency.”); see also United States v.
Petty, 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.1993).  A second eyewitness, Sharita Wright, identified
Barfield as the assailant in a photo array. See Sciarrino, 884 F.2d at 664 (finding
sufficient indicia of reliability where hearsay evidence was corroborated by statements of
other witnesses).  Jones’s confrontation with Barfield, the ensuing shooting, and a
6ballistics analysis linking the weapon to shells recovered from the crime scene all support
Cheeseborough’s identification of Barfield as the perpetrator of the robbery and shooting. 
Significantly, no contrary evidence was adduced by defendant. 
The record also provides no basis to question Cheeseborough’s credibility.  See
Miele, 989 F.2d at 667 (emphasizing importance of declarant’s credibility to reliability
analysis).  Cheeseborough’s identification of Barfield was consistent and unwavering. See
also Duarte, 950 F.2d at 1265-66 (vacating and remanding drug quantity-based sentence
because court relied on one of two contradictory estimates from same witness without
addressing the contradiction).  Cheeseborough’s subsequent conduct—her
communication of the robbery to Jones and immediate report of the shooting to police,
which prompted a criminal investigation and the procurement of a warrant for Barfield’s
arrest—confirm the veracity of her statements. See United States v. Knife, 9 F.3d 705, 706
(8th Cir. 1993) (deeming reliable victim statements corroborated by victim’s conduct and
documentary evidence).  Barfield does not identify—and our independent review of the
record does not disclose—a motive for Cheeseborough to fabricate the crimes reported.
See also Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 650 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding hearsay evidence
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) where declarant lacked a motive to fabricate). 
 On this record, we conclude that Cheeseborough’s statements to police were
reliable, that their admission at sentencing was proper, and that adequate evidence thus
supported the District Court’s determination that Barfield possessed a firearm or
7ammunition “in connection with a crime of violence,” triggering a one-point increase in
defendant’s offense level. See § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A).
Barfield also contends that his sentence of 25 years exceeded the statutory
maximum term and was thus unconstitutional.  Barfield’s conviction under section
922(g)(1) carried a statutory maximum prison term of ten years.  At sentencing, however,
the District Court determined that Barfield’s prior felony drug convictions triggered a
sentence enhancement under section 924(e), which carries a statutory maximum term of
life imprisonment, thus enabling it to impose the higher sentence.  Barfield’s chief
contention is that Apprendi v. New Jersey requires jury determination of his prior
convictions. 530 U.S. at 489-90.  Apprendi held that facts increasing a defendant’s
statutory maximum term must be pled and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
However, Apprendi underscored the principle, set forth in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998), that prior convictions triggering a sentence
enhancement need only be found by the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the
evidence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489.  Accordingly, judicial determination of Barfield’s
prior felony convictions was permissible, and his sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment did
not violate Apprendi.
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment and Conviction Order of the District
Court will be AFFIRMED.
